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Municipal Zoning Restrictions on Adult
Entertainment: Young, Its Progeny, and Indianapolis'
Special Exceptions Ordinance
The growth of suburban America in the 1950's and 1960's transformed
tranquil urban neighborhoods into blighted areas filled with vacant
buildings and plagued by dwindling property values.' Adult bookstores,
adult movie theaters, massage parlors, pawn shops, pool halls, and other
similar establishments gradually displaced corner grocery stores and family-
owned, first-run movie houses.' In an effort to combat the deterioration
of their neighborhoods and, at the same time, monitor public morals by
checking prostitution and gambling, many cities enacted ordinances aimed
at the reduction or obliteration of these businesses.3 Although anti-vice
statutes by and large have enjoyed insulation from constitutional
challenges,4 ordinances that control adult bookstores and movie theaters
through zoning regulation have met continual opposition on first amend-
ment and equal protection grounds.'
The United States Supreme Court has attempted to articulate standards
by which the validity of zoning ordinances regulating adult6 uses can be
measured. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.7 offers one exposition
of the constitutional limits on the regulation of adult uses, but the ques-
In an affidavit, a Detroit real estate developer and appraiser said that:
[Wihen it first appears that [adult bookstores and theaters] are beginning to
cluster in a neighborhood, those nearby residents and businessmen who can af-
ford to move will immediately offer their property for sale, and assume any finan-
cial loss rather than gamble on the anticipated decline in property values; that
the anticipation whether or not warranted in fact is sufficient to and does cause
the property owners to flee the area; that the appearance of more than one or
two vacant store fronts ... creates an apprehension in the minds of the pro-
spective buyers .... That other neighboring residents and businesses recognizing
the situation that their property values are in jeopardy and so offer their names
and businesses to "get out while the getting's good"; that the resulting surplus
of properties ... causes a further decline in sale prices, that a home which would
sell for $45,000 outside the City of Detroit is sold with difficulty at a loss of almost
half that amount in these declining neighborhoods.
Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 20, Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976).
1 See The Indianapolis Star, Jan. 25, 1982, at 23, col 1.
3 See generally W. TONER. REGULATING Sax BUSINESSES 19-30 (1977) (survey of ordinances
controlling adult uses in Boston, Detroit, New Orleans, Norwalk, Cal. and Santa Maria, Cal.).
' See, e.g., IND. CODE S 35-45-5-1 to -5 (1982) (gambling statute that has survived challenges).
' See infra notes 108-76 and accompanying text.
' "Adult" as used on this note must be distinguished from "obscene." Materials judged
"obscene" under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,23 (1973), are afforded no first amendment
protection. Nonobscene "adult" materials, on the other hand, deserve at least some protec-
tion. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion).
See infra notes 108-76 and accompanying text.
7 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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tions surrounding this issue are far from resolved. Each zoning ordinance
raises new questions concerning "offensive" materials, freedom of expres-
sion, and judicial treatment of the tension between these two subjects. In-
dianapolis' Commercial Special Exceptions Ordinance,8 which regulates
adult materials, recently has been challenged in two lawsuits.' Given this
most recent challenge to a zoning ordinance, similar to the one upheld in
Young, an examination of the United States Supreme Court's view of this
subject is both timely and appropriate. Along with an analysis of post-Young
opinions, this note presents a discussion of the Indianapolis ordinance and
a comparison of that ordinance with the Detroit statute upheld in Young.
The note concludes that the Indianapolis ordinance is unconstitutional in
view of the Supreme Court's attitude toward laws that encroach upon first
amendment rights.
MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF ADULT AND
OTHER USES PRIOR TO YOUNG
Novel systems of regulation often encounter constitutional challenges 0
8 INDIANAPOLIS. IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23 (1982).
9 Two recent suits are Cutshaw v. City of Indianapolis, No. 30, 170 (Johnson County Cir.
Ct. filed Jan. 9,1980), and Antico v. City of Indianapolis, No. S519-1613 (Marion County Super.
Ct. filed Dec. 27, 1979). Both suits challenged the Indianapolis ordinance on theories of equal
protection, due process, free speech, right to access, taking, prior restraint, and retroactivity.
Cutshaw involved massage parlors and adult bookstores situated throughout Indianapolis;
Antico concerned a popular hotel in downtown Indianapolis that rented in-room adult movies.
Both businesses were denied licenses to operate because they had failed to obtain special
exceptions as required by Indianapolis law. See INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE SS 17-220 to-334 (1982).
Upon denial of the licenses, Cutshaw sued the city in Johnson County Court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The court granted the mo-
tion on summary judgment. In Antico, the City of Indianapolis sued Antico to enjoin his hotel
from operating without a license. A Hancock County judge upheld the ordinance and granted
the injunction on summary judgment.
On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trials court's granting of summary
judgment in Antico. Antico was reversed because the trial court's record was "totally silent
as to whether the public's access to protected materials [had] been restricted or suppress-
ed." Antico v. City of Indianapolis, - Ind. App. - - , 441 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (1982).
Cutshaw also was reversed because a material issue of fact existed as to the constitutionali-
ty of the ordinance so that summary judgment was improper. Consolidated City of Indianapolis
v. Cutshaw, - Ind. App. - , 443 N.E2d 853 (1983). Incidentally, the court in Cutshaw
considered many of the arguments raised in this note but refused to offer an opinion because
of the insufficient record. See, e.g., id. at 859 (vagueness argument discussed and discarded
because of incomplete record).
" During the big-business oriented era of "Lochnerization," see Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court invalidated numerous state laws on the grounds that they
interfered with the "general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power
to contract .... Id. at 58. See also New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (laws
regulating ice manufacturing as a public utility abolished); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923) (laws prescribing minimum wages for women held violative of due process);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (law prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts held unconstitu-
tional). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 511-27 (10th
ed. 1980).
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but usually are vindicated.11 Zoning regulation in general was challenged
and upheld in 1926 in City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.12 In Euclid, the
Supreme Court held that zoning regulations will be presumed valid,"3 that
the police power is broad enough to permit governmental relegation of in-
dustrial establishments to areas apart from residential sectors, 4 and that
zoning ordinances will be upheld provided they bear a substantial relation-
ship to the "public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."1 Euclid and
its progeny, however, speak only to the validity of ordinances that control
behavior not protected by the first amendment." Thus, although Euclid
established by implication that a city may direct the location of shopping
centers, 7 residential subdivisions,18 mobile homes,19 and the like without
encroaching on a property owner's constitutional rights," the holding left
unanswered questions surrounding the validity of zoning laws that primarily
11 In the 1930's the Court cast aside its practice of reading fundamental lights into the
Constitution and began holding that any regulation bearing a real and substantial relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental goal would be upheld. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
525 (1934). See also Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (law fixing maximum employment
agency fees upheld); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (Adkins overruled).
This standard has become less strict over the past half century: a conceivable reason rationally
related to a legitimate state goal will result in the ordinance being upheld. Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (state debt-
adjusting law found unconstitutional); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423
(1952) (Court observed that it "doles] not sit as a super-legislature"). See generally G. GUN-
THER, supra note 10 at 528-43. Although the "rational basis" test suffices when nonfundamen-
tal rights are in question, the standard of review is more strict when, for example, first amend-
ment rights are violated.
12 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13 Id. at 388.
" Id. at 389-90.
15 Id. at 395 (citations omitted). This deferential view has been upheld repeatedly during
the past half century. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (most recent
application of Euclid, upholding ordinance prohibiting more than two unrelated persons from
living together, "rational basis" test deemed sufficient grounds for upholding). But see Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance preventing cohabitation by persons
related more remotely than first generation held violative of substantive due process after
city failed to meet "compelling interest" test required whenever such rights are abrogated).
11 Euclid was decided on "police power" grounds. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-90; see also
Escanaba Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1882); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S.
501, 504 (1878) (municipal actions held within police power).
1 E.g., Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Sheehan Constr. Co., 160 Ind. App. 520,525-26,
313 N.E.2d 78, 81-82 (1974).
"E.g., American Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. County of Marion, 653 F.2d 364,370 (9th Cir. 1981).
E.g., Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702 (Fla.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953); State v.
Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972).
1 For cases holding that a municipality's exercise of the police power sometimes bears
an unreasonable relationship to an asserted goal, see Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n v. Jankovich,
244 Ind. 574, 581, 193 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1963) ("taking" of air space requires compensation;
not to do so is unreasonable); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339,349,172 N.E.2d
39,43 (1961) (board advanced unreasonable justifications for denying permission to build church
and school); Arabia v. Zisman, 143 N.J. Super. 168, 175, 362 A.2d 1221, 1225 (1976), affd, 384
A.2d 1110 (1978) (ordinance allowing only owners of beach front property to place chairs on
beach held unreasonable delegation of municipal authority to private individuals).
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or incidentally restrict free speech under the first amendment. 1 Cox v. New
Hampshire' answered to some extent the questions left open in Euclid.
Cox held that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on first amend-
ment speech are permitted,2 provided the restrictions are administered
in a "fair and non-discriminatory manner."2 4
In Police Department v. Mosley,2 the Supreme Court further refined these
now axiomatic "time, place, and manner" restrictions. In Mosley, a city or-
dinance prohibited picketing within 150 feet of a school unless the school
being picketed was involved in a labor dispute.26 The Court held this or-
dinance violative of equal protection. It reasoned that although "reasonable
'time, place and manner' regulations of picketing may be necessary to fur-
ther significant governmental interests," the ordinance describes imper-
missible picketing "not in terms of time, place and manner, but in terms
of subject matter."' Citing a long line of cases holding content-based restric-
tions unconstitutional,9 the Court reaffirmed its constitutional mandate of
keeping channels of communication open30 and ensuring that regulations
restricting speech protected by the first amendment be upheld only if the
regulations truly are content neutral."
21 These questions were addressed prior to Young, 427 U.S. 50 (plurality opinion), in Erz-
noznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1971);
and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). See infra notes 25-46 and accompanying text.
2 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Cox involved first amendment and equal protection challenges to
an ordinance requiring a license before holding a parade on a public street. The Court saw
the regulation here as no more restrictive than a traffic signal. Id. at 574. Cox left open,
however, the question of content-based regulations. See id. at 578.
Id. at 576.
24 Id. at 577.
2 408 U.S. 92 (1971).
Id. at 92-93.
1 Id. at 98 (citations omitted).
Id. at 99.
Id. at 95, citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971) (conviction for wearing jacket
bearing words "Fuck the Draft" held violative of first and fourteenth amendments); Street
v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (conviction for uttering defamatory words about American
flag held unconstitutional); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (showing of
malice required to recover in defamation action); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (striking
down Virginia statute that forbade attorneys to accept compensation for organizations with
no pecuniary right in case; statute held invalid as undue restriction on free speech); Wood
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (punishing persons for speaking out on public issues currently
before a jury not "clear and present danger" and therefore violative of first amendment);
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (ordinance barring speech which "invites
dispute" held violative of first amendment); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (meeting
held by advocate of violence held within protection of fourteenth amendment).
See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
21 Id. at 99. "Above all else," said the Court, "the first amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its idea, its subject matter,
or its content" Id at 95. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (statute allowing picketing
of places of employment but not residence held unconstitutional usingMosley rationale). One
must remember that content-based regulations will be upheld if the state can prove that a
compelling interest exists and that the statute is as narrowly drawn as possible. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (ordinance preventing burning of draft cards upheld
[Vol. 58:505
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The Court refined the Euclid-Cox-Mosley line of cases to address adult
uses in Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville . 2 Jacksonville had enacted an or-
dinance prohibiting motion pictures or other film presentations depicting
"the human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or
human bare pubic areas .... if such motion picture.., is visible from any
public street or public place."' The city maintained that the ordinance com-
plied with the Euclid requirement that the restriction affect only time,
place, and manner, and argued that its interest in protecting children
outweighed detrimental effects on free speech.35 The Court summarily re-
jected this justification and held that the restriction was vague because
it reached all forms of nudity, including a "a baby's buttocks, the nude body
of a war victim, or scenes from a culture where nudity is indigenous."' Since
nudity is not per se obscene 7 and therefore is afforded constitutional
protection, the Court found this ordinance too loosely drawn to guard ef-
fectively against abrogation of constitutional rights.'
The city's primary argument in Erznoznik was that its paramount goal
was to "protect its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that
may be offensive."4 The Court seized upon this argument to emphasize that
as legitimate means of ensuring orderly disposition of conscription system); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ordinance banning sound trucks upheld as legitimate means of maintain-
ing quiet city).
422 U.S. 205 (1975).
3 JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 330.313 (1972) (quoted in Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 206-07).
See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See also Manual Enters. v. Day,
370 U.S. 478, 490 (1962) (Court observed that "not every portrayal of male or female nudity
is obscene"); Birkenshaw v. Haley, 409 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (government has no
power to impose outright ban on nude or semi-nude public conduct); Southeastern Promo-
trons v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634,642 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (nudity is constitutionally pro-
tected form of expression).
" Obscene material, on the other hand, deserves no constitutional protection. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957). The Court
in Miller articulated guidelines for deciding whether material is obscene:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks, serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Cf infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
Erzonznik, 422 U.S. at 214. At oral argument the city attempted to justify the ordinance
as a means of reducing distractions to passing motorists whose gaze might be diverted from
the highway to a drive-in movie screen. Id. at 214. The Court rejected this argument: if the
state interest was indeed traffic safety, then the ordinance in question was underinclusive
because "[t]here is no reason to think that ... other scenes in the customary screen diet,
ranging from soap opera to violence, would be any less distracting to the passing motorist."
Id. at 214-15.
'" Id. at 208.
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viewpoint-based restrictions on free speech may not be justified as time,
place, and manner restrictions. 1
In sum, time, place, and manner restrictions prior to Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc.2 were a valid exercise of the police power"3 if the city
justified these restrictions by a rational governmental purpose." When
these restrictions encroached on first amendment rights, however, the
restrictions had to be imposed without regard to the content of the speech
being regulated. 5 If the restriction was based on content, however, the
regulation could be justified only if the government successfully proved
the existence of a compelling interest. 6
YOUNG: NEW APPROACHES TO THE REQUIREMENT OF
CONTENT NEUTRALITY
In the early 1970's, Detroit found itself faced with the dilemma that had
beset other American cities.47 Many of its inner-city neighborhoods had
become blighted strips filled with adult bookstores, adult movie theaters,
cabarets, and other undesirable businesses."8 In response to this urban
deterioration, the Detroit City Council amended 9 an anti-skid row
"' Id. at 208-09. The Court noted that "the Constitution does not permit government to
decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require pro-
tection for the unwilling listener or viewer." Id. at 210. The distinction between content-based
and viewpoint-based restrictions is explored more fully elsewhere in this note. See infra notes
80-81 and accompanying text.
42 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
" See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
," Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 215.
46 E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (ordinance preventing burn-
ing of draft cards upheld as legitimate means of ensuring orderly disposition of conscription
system); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (ordinance banning sound trucks
upheld as legitimate means of maintaining quiet city).
The Supreme Court has, however, carved out exceptions to the general notion that first
amendment restrictions must be content-neutral. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (material not obscene as to adults may be obscene as to children); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (standard for proving libel different when plaintiff is public
official or public figure); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words"
not within scope of first amendment.) For a discussion of these distinctions, see infra notes
70-82 and accompanying text.
17 See generally W. TONER. supra note 3.
" Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
"Undesirable" in this context and in the context of the Detroit ordinance refers to businesses
that work a cumulative effect on neighborhoods by destroying property values, promoting
prostitution, and causing crime. Some members of the Court in Young suggested that if a
city viewed "undesirable" businesses as those which would damage the moral fiber of the
community, then the distinction between "undesirable" and "desirable" would be an imper-
missible one. Young, 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Common Council did
not inversely zone adult theaters in an effort to protect citizens against the content of adult
movies. If that had been its purpose .... the case might be analogous to [Erznoznik].") (em-
phasis in original)). See also infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
'" Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 742-G (Oct. 26, 1972) (amending Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 390-G).
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ordinance- to include movie theaters, adult bookstores, pawn shops, and
other uses. In general, the ordinance provided that an adult theater or
similar use could not be located within 500 feet of an area zoned for residen-
tial use or within 1000 feet of any two other regulated uses, 1 The ordinance
also defined "adult" movies and bookstores as those which depicted or sold
materials that depicted "specified sexual activities" or "specified anatomical
areas." 2 These terms in turn were defined in the ordinance.'
Two adult theater owners challenged the ordinance with a petition for
an injunction and declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality.' Both
theaters were located within 1000 feet of two other regulated uses.5 The
district court upheld the ordinance, 8 but the Sixth Circuit reversed,5 7
holding that the city had failed to discharge its heavy burden of "showing
that the method which it chose to deal with the problem at hand was
necessary and that its effect on protected rights was only incidental."" The
majority opinion reaffirmed the judicial commitment to the requirement
of Police Department v. Mosley"9 that time, place, and manner restrictions
may not be based on the content of materials protected under the first
amendment.'
In reversing the court of appeals,"' the Supreme Court created a substan-
tial exception to the Mosley doctrine.2 First, in rejecting the respondents'
vagueness arguments," the Court found that the theater owners lacked
standing to raise vagueness claims because, even though the ordinance
The effect of the amendment was a differentiation between "motion pictures which exhibit
sexually explicit 'adult' movies and those which do not." Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Young, 427 U.S. at 54 (plurality opinion). Anti-skid row ordinances are so named because
they focus on "the relationship between a series of uses that ... have or create a 'skid-row
effect' on adjoining properties." W. TONER. supranote 3, at 2. These ordinances generally in-
clude definitions of pornographic uses and seek either to disperse or concentrate adult uses. Id.
11 Regulated uses included, among others, adult bookstores, cabarets, theaters with fewer
than fifty seats ("mini theaters"), pool halls, hotels, and taverns. Detroit, Mich., Ordinance
742-G SS 66.000, 66.0103 (Oct. 26, 1972).
Id. S 32.0007.
&3 Id.
I Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 365 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd, 518 F2d
1014 (6th Cir. 1975), affd, 539 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976).
One of the theaters also was within 500 feet of a residential area. See id. at 364.
Id. at 371. The provisions pertaining to the 500 foot restrictions, however, were declared
invalid. Id.
17 American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1021 (6th Cir. 1975), reh'g.
denied, 429 U.S. 783.
Id. at 1020.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d at 1020.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion).
62 By allowing some content-based restrictions on first amendment rights, the Court
modified the traditional idea that such restraints must be content neutral. Compare id. at
66 with Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1971) (content neutrality held indispensable)
and supra note 31 (content-based restrictions valid if narrowly drawn to effectuate compelling
governmental interest).
13 Young, 427 U.S. at 58-61.
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might be vague as applied to other theater owners, it was clearly not vague
as applied to them." The Court then acknowledged that third parties
sometimes have standing to raise vagueness issues when first amendment
rights are at stake,65 but found that this exception was not apposite in the
present case because adult movies were not of sufficient "value" to allow
third parties to raise the constitutional rights of others; the exception should
instead be reserved for speech whose dissemination encourages a "free and
open market for the interchange of ideas."66 Second, the Court dismissed
the theater owners' contention that the licensing requirements imposed
on adult theaters constituted a prior restraint on protected speech. 7 The
Court rejected this argument, observing that mere zoning requirements
do not work a prior restraint unless the requirements totally exclude com-
munication prior to its dissemination. 8
Having disposed of these two arguments, the Court then turned to an
equal protection analysis of the ordinance,69 beginning with a modification
Specifically, respondents objected to the language of the statute that imposed the re-
quirement of a waiver of the 1000 foot restriction for all uses that were "characterized by
their emphasis... on 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas:" Detroit,
Mich., Ordinance 742-G S 32.0007 (Oct. 26, 1972). In rejecting this argument, the Court noted
that "both theaters propose to offer adult fare on a regular basis." Young, 427 U.S. at 59
(plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court concluded, "It is clear... that any ele-
ment of vagueness in these ordinances has not affected these respondents." Id; cf. Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,617 (1973) ("conduct appellants have been charged with falls squarely
within . . . proscriptions [of statute]").
A general rule of the law of standing is that "a person to whom a statute may constitu-
tionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may con-
ceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court."
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (citations omitted). When the first amendment is
at stake, however, third parties have sometimes been permitted to raise the claims of others
because the policies of standing yield to "the overriding importance of maintaining a free
and open market for the interchange of ideas." Young, 427 US. at 60 (plurality opinion).
Young, 427 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963)
(corporation entitled to assert members' first amendment rights where corporation's goal
was elimination of racial discrimination and where state statute inhibited corporation's at-
tainment of that goal).
I Prior restraint generally involves the notion that speech may not be restrained "prior
to a communication's dissemination, or prior to 'an adequate determination that [the expres-
sion] is not protected by the First Amendment.'" L. TRIE. AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
S 12-31, at 725 (1978) (citation omitted) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)). Therefore, the municipal regulation in Young
was not a prior restraint because there was "no claim that distributors or exhibitors of adult
films [were] denied access to the market.... Viewed as an entity, the market for this com-
modity [was] essentially unrestrained." Young, 427 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
" Id. at 58-61. The Court's emphasis on the distinction between zoning that consolidates
or disperses theaters and zoning that absolutely forbids theaters becomes essential in an
analysis of the Indianapolis ordinance. See also Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61 (1981); see infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
" "Equal protection" arguably carries the same meaning as "content regulation" so that
Young and Mosley can easily be viewed as first amendment cases. The equal protection analysis
of Young has engendered a great deal of scholarly criticism. See generally, Note, Constitu-
tional Law-First Amendment-Content Neutrality, 28 CASE W.RES. L. REV. 456 (1978); Note,
Content-Based Classifications of Protected Speech: A Less Vital Interest?, 1976 UTAH L. REV.
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of Mosley." The Court noted that "government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content,"'71 and that "the sovereign's agreement or disagreement with the
content of what a speaker has to say may not affect the regulation of the
time, place, or manner of presenting the speech."72 The Court then listed
instances in which expression was permissibly restricted on the basis of
content. 3 Recovery in a libel action, for example, is permissibly governed
by the content of the message: "malice" must be proven in libel claims by
a public official,74 but a lesser standard will sustain a claim when the plain-
tiff is a private citizen.75 Similarly, material that is not obscene as to adults
may be constitutionally defined as obscene as to minors. 6 Finally, states
may constitutionally set apart "fighting words" and exclude these words
from first amendment protection. 77 The Court then listed non-obscene but
"adult" materials as another category of speech that may be regulated on
the basis of content if the regulation serves some significant state interest.78
At the same time, however, the Court in Young reiterated its commit-
ment to governmental neutrality whenever speech is regulated. Regula-
tions that suppress speech because the government disagrees with the
speaker's viewpoint cannot be justified. On the other hand, regulations that
restrict speech merely because of its subject matter and for reasons not
related to the government's appraisal of the speech itself are valid. 0 Since
the Detroit ordinance regulated the exhibition of all adult films without
reference to the government's viewpoint of the messages contained in any
616; Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Levels of Protected Speech, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 321 (1977), Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: The War on
Neighborhood DeteriorationLeaves First Amendment Casualty, 6 ENVTL AFF. 101 (1977); Note,
Zoning, Adult Movie Theaters, and the First Amendment: An Approach to Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 5 HOFSTRA L. Rrv. 379 (1977). These notes object to the Court's failure to
go beyond mere assertions that some speech deserves less first amendment protection than
other speech. The Court's failure to articulate the proper balancing test leads to confusion
and allows broad discretion for municipal officials.
" Young, 427 U.S. at 59-61.
71 Id. at 64 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1971).
72 Id. (plurality opinion).
7 Id. at 66 (plurality opinion).
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-0 (1964).
7 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-45 (1974).
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
7' See Young, 427 U.S. at 68-69 (plurality opinion). The holdings in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), lead
to the conclusion that the broad language of Mosley is of questionable validity. The addition
of "adult" materials to the list of categories of speech which may be regulated on the basis
of content further weakens the bold assertion set forth in Mosley.
Young, 427 U.S. at 67-68 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion). The Court illustrated the viewpoint-content distinction in a com-
mercial speech context: "[Although the content of a story must be examined to decide whether
it involves a public figure or a public issue, the Court's application of the relevant rule may
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particular film, the ordinance was upheld as a permissible content-based
regulation.' Finally, the Court pointed out that the Detroit ordinance would
be invalid, notwithstanding the foregoing criteria, if the ordinance caused
total exclusion or suppression of adult uses.2"
Having decided that the Detroit ordinance was both based on content
and grounded in governmental neutrality, the Court turned to its justifica-
tion for upholding a content-based, viewpoint-neutral classification in the
area of adult materials." The Court explained its new classification by ad-
ding that adult forms of speech and conduct, while not obscene under Miller
v. California," nonetheless deserve less constitutional protection than do
"legitimate" forms of expression such as political debate or philosophical
discussion. This line of reasoning resembles the Court's treatment of com-
mercial speech, fighting words, and other forms of speech where content-
based regulation is permissible. The Court's candid assessment of adult
not depend on its favorable or unfavorable appraisal of that figure or that issue." Id. (plural-
ity opinion).
Professor Ely finds the Young distinction inconsistent with the Court's commercial speech
classification. He notes that the Court's classification of adult speech as less protected "runs
precisly counter to the point of an 'unprotected messages' approach, which is that unless
the expression in question falls into one of the unprotected categories, it is fully protected
against content-directed regulation, irrespective of how it might measure up against other
protected expression." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 115 n.27 (1980).
1 Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion). Compare the result in Erznoznik, where the
Court overturned a similar ordinance because the city's purpose in enacting the ordinance
was to "protect its citizens from exposure to unwanted 'offensive' speech." Id. at 71 n.34
(plurality opinion). In other words, the Erznoznik restrictions were grounded in the city's
point of view about adult speech and not in the city's interest in preserving urban blight
or meeting some other state interest unrelated to the content of the speech itself. Id. (plural-
ity opinion). In Young, on the-other hand, the Court found that the city's interest in preserv-
ing urban neighborhoods justified an imposition on protected speech, that the imposition
was viewpoint neutral, and that the ordinance was therefore constitutional. Id. at 71 (plurality
opinion); see generally L. TPBE, supra note 67, S 12-19, at 679-80.
Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35 (plurality opinion). The plurality observed that
[t]he situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of sup-
pressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech. Here, however, the
District Court specifically found that... "[t]here are myriad locations in the
City of Detroit which must be over 1000 feet from existing regulated
establishments. This burden on First Amendment rights is slight."
Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Nortown Theatre v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 370 (E.D. Mich.
1974)).
' Young, 427 U.S. at 70-73 (plurality opinion).
" 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
" Four members of the court joined Justice Stevens' formulation of the "less protected
speech" rationale:
[Slociety's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly dif-
ferent, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate.
... Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud
or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty
to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march
our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see
"Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theatres of our choice.
Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
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speech and conduct, however, marked the first instance in which the Court
assigned relative values to different kinds of constitutionally protected
speech. This "less protected speech" rationale is suspicious because it vests
in administrative officials and judges the power to decide how much con-
stitutional protection a given form of speech deserves. Consequently, Young
is ineffective as a tool for determining which categories of speech will be
afforded less protection in subsequent cases.' Moreover, the Court's rank-
ing of first amendment rights departs radically from its analysis in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.'
In Gertz, the Court refused to set specific standards for recovery in libel
actions. Instead, it articulated general guidelines, permitting the states to
"retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy...."I
This approach contemplated the lack of wisdom in committing "[the task
of fashioning remedies] to the conscience of judges."' It is difficult to recon-
cile these disparate views of judicial intervention, especially since both
Young and Gertz involved similarly treated types of speech. However, the
differing forms of speech in Gertz and Young may provide one possible basis
for reconciling the two cases. Perhaps the plurality in Young felt that adult
speech deserves even less protection than defamatory speech so that "un-
wise" judicial decisions would be less harmful in cases involving Young-
implicated situations than in Gertz situations.
In summary, Young stands for the proposition that content-based regula-
tions of adult materials are permissible if they do not lead to total suppres-
sion of speech and if they serve some significant state interest" not related
to the government's appraisal of the message expressed. A plurality of the
Court based its holding on the idea that adult speech is worthy of less pro-
tection than other forms of speech and conduct."
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 762 (1977) (Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall expressed concern the Pacifica holding means
that "the degree of protection that the first amendment affords protected speech varies
with the social value ascribed to that speech by five Members of the Court." Id. at 762-63.
See also, Note, Constitutional Law, 12 AKRON L. REV. 284 (1978k, Note, "Indecent"Language:
A New Class of Prohibitable Speech? FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 297
(1978-79).
', 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974).
Id. at 34546.
Id. at 346.
9' The standard of judicial review was not articulated in Young. See Note, Content-Based
Classifications of Protected Speech: A Less Vital Interest?, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 616, 617-30
(discussion of whether "rational basis" or "strict scrutiny" test was intended in determin-
ing legitimacy of state interest in creating content-based classification).
1, See Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion). A few words about the concurring and
dissenting Justices' opinions are in order, especially since Justice Powell's concurring opin-
ion was the swing vote in Young. Justice Powell emphasized the fact that the Detroit or-
dinance did not totally suppress protected speech but that it merely dispersed the theaters.
Id. at 77-79 (Powell, J. concurring). Justice Powell then claimed that the ordinance was
not content-based but rather a permissible regulation under the four-part test in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Under the O'Brien test,
a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its incidental im-
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SCHAD AND THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-EXCLUSION
A recent Supreme Court case illustrates the crucial distinction between
dispersal or concentration of adult uses and outright exclusion of them.
pact upon First Amendment interests, "if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on ... First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
Young, 427 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J. concurring) (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). Since
the criteria of O'Brien had been met, Justice Powell argued, the inquiry need go no fur-
ther. Erznoznik, on the other hand, was not apposite because it represented a direct at-
tempt to regulate speech and to further governmental interests not wholly unrelated to
the regulation of expression. Id. at 83-84 (Powell, J. concurring). Powell failed to recognize,
however, that Young did not fit squarely within the O'Brien analysis because O'Brien in-
volved a governmental interest (cohesive military system) unrelated to suppression (the
burning of draft cards), whereas Young concerned a governmental interest (preservation
of neighborhoods) related to suppression (zoning of adult theaters).
Finally, Justice Powell distinguished Erznoznik by hinting that improper legislative motive
rendered the Jacksonville ordinance invalid. This analysis seems to be similar to that used
in racial discrimination cases where ordinances were invalidated for "bad motive." See Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (plaintiff must
show "that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision"); Gomilion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); cf. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (plaintiffs
failed to prove discriminatory purpose).
Professor Ely contends that motive is relevant in first amendment cases "[wihere the
good or right whose distribution is in issue is not one whose provisions or accommodation
is affirmatively required ...." J. ELY, supra note 80 at 141. Thus, although cities are not
obligated to provide for adult movies, their restriction must not be based on municipal
viewpoint of the content of a particular adult movie. Young, 427 U.S. at 64 (plurality opin-
ion); see supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
Although Professor Ely finds legislative motive relevant in certain first amendment
areas, J. ELY, supra note 80, at 141, a more cogent approach can be reached through a "means
end" analysis, see infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text, and through a "content view-
point" distinction, see supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text; see infra notes 159-69 and
accompanying text. This analysis obviates the need for motive analysis in an area where
it has generally not been invoked and vitiates the problems that attend legislative mind-
reading and determining dominant motive. See, e.g., Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Ap-
proach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95. See also
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). The court there contended that
[i]t is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the "sole" or "domi-
nant" motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators. Furthermore,
there is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because
of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason,
rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be
valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons.
Id. at 225.
In two sets of dissenting opinions, Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun
lamented that the majority opinion set the stage for selective enforcement, id. at 85 (Stewart,
J., dissenting), and unbridled enforcement discretion on questions of what is and is not
protected, id. at 91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters observed that "Ithe fact that
the 'offensive' speech here may not address 'important' topics . .. does not mean that
it is less worthy of constitutional protection," id. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and warn-
ed that permitting unpleasant speech is "the price to pay for constitutional freedom." Id.
at 88.
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Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim9' concerned a local ordinance that in ef-
fect banned all forms of live entertainment. 3 The ordinance was challenged
by an adult bookstore owner who had installed a coin-operated device that
permitted a customer to watch a nude dancer behind a glass panel.' In strik-
ing down the ordinance as violative of the first amendment, the Court relied
upon a "less intrusive [means]" analysis 95 and held that the Borough had
failed to justify its total ban on public entertainment." Furthermore, the
Court dismissed the notion that the Mt. Ephraim ordinance was a valid
time, place, and manner restriction under Young.'
The Court found Young inapposite to the ordinance in Schad because the
Detroit ordinance in Young "did not affect the number of adult movie
theaters... in the city; it merely dispersed them."98 The Mt. Ephraim or-
dinance, on the other hand, effected an outright ban on live entertainment.
The Court pointed to its refusal to "approve the total exclusion from the
city of theaters showing adult, but not obscene materials,", and noted that
the Detroit ordinance imposed no limitation on the number of regulated
uses."' Schad thereby reaffirmed the Court's careful distinction in Young
between permissible regulation and impermissible suppression."'
Although the regulation-suppression distinction allows Schad and Young
to be read consistently, it is important to note that the Schad Court did
not apply Justice Stevens' "less protected speech" rationale."2 The Court
452 U.S. 61 (1981).
"3 MT. EPHRAIw, N.J., ORDINANCE § 99-15B (1975). The ordinance allowed the operation of
motels and only certain kinds of retail establishments, most of which were oriented toward
neighborhood convenience. Id. The ordinance further provided that "[aill uses not expressly
permitted in this chapter are prohibited." Id. § 99-4. Since no forms of live entertainment
were listed in the permitted use section of the ordinance, all forms of live entertainment
were banned. See id.
Schad, 452 U.S. at 62.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 72 (footnote omitted). Mt. Ephraim sought to justify the ordinance on two grounds.
First, the Borough argued that "permitting live entertainment would conflict with its plan
to create a commercial area that caters only to the 'immediate needs' of its residents ......
Id. at 72. Second, the Borough contended "that it may selectively exclude commercial live
entertainment from the broad range of commercial uses permitted in the Borough [in order
to] avoid ... problems ... such as parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities."
Id. at 73. The Court found the ordinance too broadly drawn to address these problems
constitutionally. "The Borough has not established that its interests could not be met by
restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression." Id. at 74.
Sehad, 452 U.S. at 74-76.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 76.
1c3 Id.
1o' See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
11 Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he hinted that
nude dancing was less protected than other forms of speech. He contended: [E]ven though
the foilage of the First Amendment may cast protective shadows over some forms of nude
dancing, . . . its roots were germinated by more serious concerns that are not necessarily
implicated by a content-neutral zoning ordinance banning commercial exploitation of live
entertainment. Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1976) (foot-
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instead favored a more traditional "less intrusive [means]" approach 113 with
a special emphasis on the legitimacy of the municipality's justifications for
permitting or prohibiting certain forms of protected speech."'
The Court's hesitancy to use a "less protected speech" theory has never
been fully explained. However, one possible explanation for the reluctance
to apply this analysis to Schad and other cases involving adult forms of
expression is that further application might lead to an outright ban on such
activities. The normative judgments inherent in a "less protected speech"
analysis must be exercised with care. Application of these judgments would
lead to a total ban on any and all forms of speech that encourage anything
less than "untrammeled political debate""'  or "political oratory or
philosophical discussion.""' 6 The Supreme Court might simply fear the
ramifications of wholesale bans on "less protected speech" and therefore
might be unwilling to take the first step by applying a "less protected
speech" analysis to adult uses."' Thus, although the reasons for the holdings
in Young and Schad differ slightly, the underlying policy of allowing regula-
tion of protected speech but prohibiting its suppression pervades both opin-
ions and has retained its vitality."'
note omitted). Schad, 452 U.S. at 80. Justice Blackmun also filed a concurring opinion in
which he objected to the fact that Mt. Ephraim's ordinance forced its citizens to travel
to communities in which they "have no political voice," id. at 78, in order to view live
entertainment.
Justices Powell and Stewart filed a separate concurring opinion in which they briefly
suggested that a city could ban all live entertainment if the ordinance were carefully drawn
and reflective of the least restrictive means of reaching an asserted interest. Id. at 79.
See also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
103 Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74 (1981).
10. Id. at 74-75. For further examples of cases which focus on the municipality's justifica-
tions, see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528-30 (1981) (concurring
opinion) (city failed to provide adequate justification for restriction on protected activity);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (concurring opinion) (city's
interest in regulating commercial property found adequate); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 89 (1949) (city's interest in quiet surroundings outweighs ramifications of ban on sound
trucks). But see, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (protection
of citizens from "offensive" materials not legitimate interest given first amendment
implications).
Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion).
,ol Id. (plurality opinion).
107 See, e.g., Young, 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart observed
that first amendment freedoms are not defined in terms of importance; and that, absent
a determination of obscenity, adult forms of conduct are not unimportant. See id. (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
10' Another recent case, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), in-
volved a San Diego ordinance that allowed billboards advertising goods or services available
on the property where the sign was located. Billboards containing all other forms of com-
mercial and noncommercial advertising were banned unless the form of advertising fell
within one of twelve exceptions. A plurality of the Court upheld the ordinance "insofar
as it regulated commercial speech." Id. at 512 (emphasis added). The plurality referred
to prior decisions which held that commercial speech enjoys only "'a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
non-commercial expression." Id. at 506 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
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INDIANAPOLIS' SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS ORDINANCE: YOUNG REVISITED
OR A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE?
In 1976, the Indianapolis City-County Council adopted a Commercial
Special Exceptions Ordinance aimed at regulating amusement arcades,
adult bookstores, massage parlors, and adult theaters."°9 An examination
of this ordinance under Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc."10 and Schad
v. Borough ofMt. Ephraim"' as well as a discussion of the general constitu-
tional validity of the ordinance, lead to the conclusion that, although the
ordinance is similar to the one upheld in Young, it suffers from constitu-
tional infirmities that render it invalid.
Vague Statutory Language
The Supreme Court has continually voiced great concern whenever a
vague"' ordinance encroaches upon first amendment freedoms." The Court
456 (1978)). Under this view of commercial speech, the Court concluded the San Diego or-
dinance was valid as to commercial speech. Id. at 512.
With respect to noncommercial speech, on the other hand, the plurality held the ordinance
invalid because it permitted content-based restrictions on noncommercial speech. Id. at
513. Without reference to Young, the Court reiterated its traditional stand on time, place,
and manner restrictions by holding that "[these restrictions] are permissible if 'they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.... serve a significant
governmental interest, and.., leave open ample alternative channels of communication
of the information."' Id. at 516 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
Young and Metromedia can easily be reconciled because the legitimacy of restrictions
on commercial speech is well established and because the noncommercial speech regulated
in Metromedia lacked the "less protected" characteristics of the speech regulated in Young.
Metromedia raises the issue, however, of whether or not cities can control adult uses on
a theory of aesthetics, and prevention of urban blight, if the ordinance addressing these
goals can survive a "least restrictive means" test and is buttressed by corresponding "com-
prehensive coordinated efforts to address other ... contributors to an unattractive environ-
ment." See generally Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New General
Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REv. 603 (1981).
". INDIANAPOLS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23 (1982). The ordinance requires the grant of a special
exception by the Marion County Board of Zoning Appeals for all "Class 1 Regulated Com-
mercial Uses." Id. 5 1C. These uses include amusement arcades (including coin operated
booths featisring live nude dancers), massage parlors, adult bookstores, and adult movie
theaters. Id. S 1A. Furthermore, if the proposed class 1 regulated commercial use is within
500 feet of a residential district, church, school, or other similar use, the applicant is re-
quired to obtain both a zoning variance pursuant to IND. CODE S 36-7-4-918(e)(2) (1982), and
a Special Exception. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE S lB. Unlike the Detroit ordinance at issue
in Young, the Indianapolis ordinance does not speak to the proximity of one adult use to
other adult uses, but instead addresses the establishment of the use in the absolute and
the proximity of the use to other zoning districts.
"' 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
" 452 U.S. 61.
1 No distinction is drawn in this note between vagueness and overbreadth; the two
doctrines overlap considerably. One scholar considers standing the only difference between
the two. See L. TRIBE, supra note 67, 5§ 12-28 to -29, at 719-20 (1978).
"I See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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has characterized a vague statute or ordinance as one so unclear that "men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning" '  The In-
dianapolis ordinance, unlike its Detroit counterpart,"' contains language
that would force a theater or bookstore owner or some other man of "com-
mon intelligence" to guess at its meaning. For example, the Indianapolis
ordinance requires that all adult theaters obtain special exceptions, "ex-
cept those establishments which only infrequently present such films. . .. ""'
As a result, the theater owner or bookseller must determine whether or
not he presents adult films only "infrequently." The vague language of the
ordinance might make an adult use owner uncertain about the legality of
his planned conduct and persuade him to forego showing adult movies or
selling adult books altogether.117 Consequently, the vague language of the
statute could have a chilling effect on the theater owner's first amendment
rights."8
In addition, the definition of the word "adult" in the Indianapolis or-
dinance restricts first amendment rights."' "Adult" in the Indianapolis or-
dinance is defined not in terms of specific content of the material but rather
114 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 417 U.S. 50, 92 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
115 The Detroit ordinance required all theaters exhibiting films that depicted "Specified
Anatomical Areas" and that fell within the distance requirements set forth in the ordinance
to obtain a waiver. Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 742-G 5 66.0103 (Oct. 24, 1972).
... INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23, S 1A4 (1982).
"I See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 684 (1968) (proprietor
"runs the risk of being foreclosed ... from a significant portion of the movie-going public");
cf. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). In invalidating a loyalty oath that required teachers
to pledge allegiance to the flag, the Court observed, "Those ... sensitive to the perils
posed by ... indefinite language avoid the risk ... only by restricting their conduct to
that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited." Id. at 371. See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 67, §5 12-28 to -29, at 718-20 (1978).
"8 See L. TRIBE, supra note 67 § 12-31, at 725 (citing Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Con-
rad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975)). Vagueness is discussed in several leading cases. See generally
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); 414 Theatre Corp. v. Murphy, 360 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"' The Detroit ordinance, on the other hand, classifies adult theaters and bookstores
as those that are "distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describ-
ing, or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas... :" Detroit,
Mich., Ordinance 742-G S 32.0007 (Oct. 26, 1972). The Supreme Court in Young rejected
respondents' argument that "they cannot determine how much of the described activity
may be permissible before the exhibition is 'characterized by an emphasis' on such matter:'
Young, 427 U.S. at 50, 58 (plurality opinion). Thus, it might appear that the Court would
accept the "infrequently" language of the Indianapolis ordinance as it did the "characterized
by an emphasis on" language of the Detroit ordinance. The Court's rejection of this argu-
ment did not rest, however, on a modification of vagueness standards. It was based in-
stead on the fact that "[t]he record indicates that both [of respondents'] theaters propose
to offer adult fare on a regular basis." Id. at 59 (footnote omitted). In other words, because
the Detroit ordinance was clearly applicable to the respondents, they lacked standing to
claim that the statute was vague as to third parties. Thus, a lack of standing instead of
a relaxation of vagueness standards led to the failure of respondents arguments.
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in terms of material that is harmful to minors under Indiana state law.'20
The Indiana Code defines "harmful to minors" in the context of a criminal
statute that prohibits dissemination of obscene material to minors and mere-
ly lists the Miller v. California' standards. Defining "adult" in this man-
ner presents constitutional difficulties. "Harmful to minors" as defined in
the statute requires a subjective judgment instead of reliance upon defini-
tions containing reference to specific activities or anatomical areas." Just
as the "infrequency" exception requires that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning,"' the "harmful to minors" language
forces a theater owner to guess whether his conduct falls within the scope
of the statute. Language so vague that it forces people to guess whether
their conduct is proscribed cannot withstand constitutional challenges." 4
Prior Restraint
The standards for granting a special exception create further constitu-
tional difficulties by imposing the threat of a prior restraint", on protected
speech. These standards give rise to infirmities not present in the Young
' INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23, § 1El (1982). See IND. CODE § 35-30-11.1 to-7 (1982)
(providing pornographic matters to minors). The Code defines "harmful to minors" as
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(1) considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors;
and
(2) is patently offensive to the prevailing standards in the adult communi-
ty as a whole with respect to what is suitable matter for or performance before
minors; and(3) considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value for minors.
Id. at § 35-30-11.1-2(d)(1)-(3).
"' 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972, see also supra note 38.
n Cf. Young, 427 U.S. 50 (plurality opinion) (ordinance upheld contained "Specified Sexual
Activities" and "Specified Anatomical Areas").
in Young, 427 U.S. 50, 92 (Blackmun, J, dissenting) (quoting Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
"' Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390
U.S. 676 (1968); Baggett v. Bullitt, 370 U.S. 360 (1964); 414 Theatre Corp. v. Murphy, 360
F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
i" Prior restraint involves suppression of speech "prior to [its] dissemination, or prior
to 'an adequate determination that [the expression] is not protected by the First Amend-
ment.'" L. TRIBE, supra note 67, § 12-31, at 725 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)) (footnote omitted). One reason behind
the invalidity of prior restraint is that
"a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse the rights of speech after
they break the law than to throttle them and all the others beforehand. It
is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the
line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that
the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable."
L. TRIBE, supra note 67, § 12-31, at 725 n.13 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Con-
rad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (emphasis in original)).
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ordinance. The Indianapolis ordinance forbids the establishment of a adult
use within 500 feet of a residential, park, church, or other similar district.126
The owner of an adult use who wishes to locate his theater within 500 feet
of these districts must apply for and obtain a special exception and a zoning
variance127 from the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals.128
Indiana law imposes upon the Board five requirements that must be met
before a zoning variance may be granted,1" but these standards contemplate
comparatively mundane cases such as variances of use and development
standards as set forth in the Indianapolis Code. 3 No separate standards
exist for the granting of a variance in special exception cases, where first
amendment rights are called into question. As a result, the Board of Zoning
Appeals is faced with inapplicable standards when the owner of an adult
use appears with special exception and variance petitions. The Supreme
Court has disapproved of regulatory schemes that lack clearly defined
statutory standards because these schemes "encourage erratic administra-
tion whether the censor be administrative or judicial."' 3' Instead, the Court
has insisted that regulatory systems that allow administrative boards to
suppress speech prior to its communication contain standards that provide
sufficient guidance for reviewing bodies."= Under these stringent guidelines
created by the Court, the broad standards of the Indianapolis ordinance
can easily be challenged.
12 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE S 36-7-4-918(f) (1982).
'2' IND. CODE S 36-74-918(f) (1982). Zoning variances are required whenever a property owner
seeks to use his property for any reasons other than those permitted by the zoning regula-
tions applicable to the property owner's land.
12 The Boards themselves are established pursuant to IND. CODE § 36-7-4-901 to -918 (1982).
12 These requirements are as follows:
(1) the grant will not be injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the community;
(2) the use or value of the area adjacent to the property included in the
variance will not be affected in a substantially adverse manner;
(3) the need for the variance arises from some condition peculiar to the prop-
erty involved and the condition is not due to the general conditions of the
neighborhood;
(4) the strict application of the terms of the zoning ordinance will constitute
an unusual and unnecessary hardship if applied to the property for which the
variance is sought; and
(5) the grant does not interfere substantially with the [metropolitan] compre-
hensive plan....
IND. CODE § 36-7-4-918(f)(1-(5) (1982).
130 See, e.g., INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 12, ch. II, S 2.05 B (1982) (standards for
high intensity commercial districts). For example, the five statutory requirements must
be met before the Board may properly grant a variance allowing a petitioner to open a
used car lot in a residential district.
13, Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 685 (1968). For other examples
of invalid laws promulgating standards that encourage "erratic administration" of the law
see Superior Films, Inc. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587, 587 (1954); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S.
960, 960 (1952); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 508 (1948).
13 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 685 (1968).
[Vol. 58:505
ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
The Board of Zoning Appeals is faced with equally unclear standards
when a proposed use is an "adult" use but is not within 500 feet of certain
districts so that a zoning variance is not required. The standards for the
granting of a special exception are very similar to the five statutory re-
quirements for granting an ordinary zoning variance."s Thus, the Board
merely applies ordinary variance standards in a situation where standards
more closely related to the justifications for regulating speech would be
appropriate. This conspicuous absence of standards calls to mind the
Supreme Court's hesitancy to accept a system that permits city officials
to control first amendment rights "prior to 'an adequate determination that
[the expression] is not protected by the First Amendment.'""
Finally, the language of the Special Exceptions Ordinance raises the
possibility that the Board of Zoning Appeals might totally exclude adult
uses from Marion County. In Young, the Court explicitly noted that the
Detroit ordinance merely regulated adult speech 3 ' without imposing an
outright ban on adult uses. The Court also was explicit in pointing out that
if the Detroit ordinance had created the possibility of total suppression,
then the ordinance probably would not have survived a constitutional
'3 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23 § 1C2 (1982). The ordinance provides that a Special
Exception will be granted upon the Board's finding that:
a. The proposed use will not be injurious to the public health, safety, morals,
convenience or general welfare; ...
c. The proposed use will not adversely affect the adjacent area or property
values therein; and
d. The proposed use will be consistent with the character of the district ....
Id. Cf. IND. CODE 5 36-7-4-918(f)(1-(5) (1982, see supra note 175.
11 L. TRIBE, supra note 67, S 12-31, at 725 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)). See also Metromedia v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 537-40 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring), citing Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1975) (theatrical performance in city-owned auditorium);
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 97 (1972) (picketing ordinance); Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-53 (1969) (picketing and parading); Staub v. City of Bax-
ley, 355 U.S. 313, 321-25 (1958) (solicitation); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951)
(public meetings); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-62 (1948) (sound trucks); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) (solicitation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163-64
(1939) (handbills); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 508, 516 (1938).
Similarly, a federal district court recently invalidated a section of the Indianapolis licen-
sing code that governed amusement arcades. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE S 17-31(c)(6) (1975)
was declared unconstitutional in Evansville Book Mart, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 477
F. Supp. 128, 132 (1979). The invalidated section provided that the decision to grant a license
was to be in the "sound discretion of an administrative official:' INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE
§ 17-31(c)(6) (1975). The court found this section of the ordinance unconstitutional because
it did "not contain adequate guidelines" and "g[ave] the controller almost unlimited dis-
cretion regarding the grant or denial of a license." Evansville Book Mart, Inc., 477 F. Supp.
at 132.
The business licensing ordinance is relevant to the Special Exceptions ordinance because
the City of Indianapolis considers coin-operated nude dancing booths "amusement machines"
and thus requires that these "machines" receive licenses from the city controller.
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 17-185 (1975).
I- Young, 427 U.S. at 62-63 (plurality opinion).
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challenge.' Furthermore, the Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim plurality
reiterated the Court's commitment to upholding ordinances that regulate
adult speech and to invalidating ordinances that suppress adult speech."'
A close comparison of the Detroit and Indianapolis ordinances shows that
the terms and procedures of the Special Exceptions Ordinance can imper-
missibly lead to an outright prior restraint on adult forms of speech.
First, the standards for granting a special exception sweep so broadly
that the Board could find, as a matter of course, that none of the standards
was met. A second and more fundamental difference between the Detroit
and Indianapolis ordinances lies in the scope of each ordinance's regula-
tion. The Detroit ordinance applies only to an adult use that either is within
1000 feet of two other adult uses" or is within 500 feet of residential
districts.39 Adult uses not located in these two areas by implication are
exempt from regulation. Thus, the ordinance in effect guarantees the ex-
istence of adult uses in all areas not within the two categories set forth
in the ordinance. The Indianapolis ordinance, on the other hand, forces all
owners of adult uses to obtain special exceptions, regardless of the loca-
tion of the use.140 As result, the Board conceivably could deny each special
exception and thereby achieve a total ban of adult uses in Indianapolis. In
other words, the Indianapolis ordinance does not contemplate dispersal of
adult uses but instead provides for their exclusion. The Supreme Court
has indicated that this extreme form of regulation is tantamount to
suppression,' and that even if adult uses are "less protected" by the first
amendment,' they may not be totally supressed.
Two recent cases reiterate the holdings of Young and Schad and further
weaken the constitutionality of the Indianapolis ordinance. In CLR Cor-
poration v. Henline,' the Sixth Circuit found a Wyoming, Michigan or-
dinance invalid, although its language was nearly identical to that of the
Detroit ordinance upheld in Young. The Wyoming ordinance contained
distance requirements for adult uses similar to those in the Detroit " and
Indianapolis"' ordinances. Relying upon language in Schad that proscribed
severe restrictions of free expression, the Sixth Circuit invalidated the
Wyoming ordinance because the city failed to "assert a factual justifica-
1 Id. at 71 n.35 (plurality opinion).
"7 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 76.
"7 Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 742-G § 66.0000 (Oct. 26, 1972). See supra note 51 and accom-
panying text.
" Id. S 66.0103.
..' INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23 S 1B (1982).
1I See Schad, 452 U.S. at 76; Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35 (plurality opinion).
142 See id.
143 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir 1983).
144 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 141. The Wyoming ordinance dictated that adult uses be located "in
'B-2' business districts and at least 500 feet from any church, school, or residence and 1,000
feet from any other restricted use." CLR Corp., 702 F.2d at 638.
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tion, compelling or otherwise, for the severe infringements of free
expression.""' The invalidation of the Wyoming ordinance resulted from
questions of degree: a "myriad of locations"'47 for restricted uses met with
the Sixth Circuit's approval, but permitting only "two to four restricted
uses in a half-mile strip of the city"1 8 overly restricted free expression.
Both the Indianapolis ordinance and the ordinance in CLR Corporation
effectuate severe restriction on free expression. The Indianapolis ordinance
makes possible a total ban on adult uses."4 The Detroit ordinance in Young,
on the other hand, dispersed adult uses, allowing them to operate in many
areas throughout the city." If "severe" limitations on adult uses are im-
permissible under CLR Corporation, then an ordinance that can completely
ban adult uses is afortiori unconstitutional.
In City of Minot v. Central Avenue News, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal of a North Dakota case upholding an adult uses or-
dinance. This dismissal indicates that the Supreme Court is unwilling to
disturb Young if a challenged ordinance is carefully drawn. In Minot, the
North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that imposed distance
limitations for adult theaters. The North Dakota court emphasized that
evidence introduced at trial showed other areas in the city in which adult
uses could relocate. The court found this availability
particularly significant in light of the fact that a central concern
of the courts in [Young] and other cases considering this issue
was the effect of... zoning space as it relates to the ability of
people in the future to gain access, as buyers or sellers, to the
adult entertainment market."'5 2
Furthermore, the court in Minot placed the ordinance outside the boun-
daries of Schad because adult entertainment was not suppressed in the city
of Minot."'
The Minot ordinance contained carefully drafted definitions of "Specified
Anatomical Areas" and "Specified Sexual Activities;" these definitions mir-
rored those set forth in the Detroit ordinance.' Furthermore, the Minot
ordinance, unlike its Indianapolis counterpart, lacked vague standards
unrelated to municipal interests. The Minot court invalidated a provision
of the ordinance, however, that called for the "closing for a year of an
CLR Corp., 702 F.2d at 639.
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50.
1 CLR Corp., 702 F.2d at 639.
Cf supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
1"0 Id.
151 308 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1117 (1981).
' Id. at 864, citing Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (Stevens, J.).
" Minot, 308 N.W.2d at 865; see supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
' Compare Minot, N.D. Ordinance No. 2236 (1979) with Detroit, Mich. Ordinance 742-G
32.0007 (Oct. 26, 1972).
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establishment to prevent the dissemination of material therein."' ,, This pro-
vision was an invalid prior restraint and recalls the need for a prompt deter-
mination of obscenity.
It therefore appears that the Supreme Court is not willing to entertain
appeals from state decisions that uphold Young-based ordinances. The risks
of total suppression, loose standards, and prior restraint, on the other hand,
might lead the Court to an opposite determination if cases challenging the
Indianapolis ordinance reached the docket. As a result, the Indianapolis
City-County Council should consider revising its ordinance so that it mir-
rors the precise standards, language, and definitions set forth in the Detroit
ordinance.
Attenuated Relationships and Illicit Objectives
The possibility of total suppression of adult uses in Indianapolis causes
one to question the purpose underlying the Special Exceptions Ordinance.
Although the preamble to the ordinance mentions the maintenance of pro-
perty values"1 and zoning district character,157 the suppressive effect of the
ordinance leads to the suspicion that the city intended to regulate morals
rather than stave off skid row when it imposed special exception re-
quirements on adult uses.58 In this regard, the Indianapolis ordinance is
similar to the one invalidated in Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville,"9 where
the Court found the relationship between the asserted governmental ob-
jective and the means of achieving that objective too attenuated to withs-
tand a constitutional challenge." Suppression as a means of achieving a
purported goal of preserving the character of the city is too tenuous a rela-
tionship for the Supreme Court.'
This attenuated means-to-end relationship also suggests that the city
sought to enact speech regulations based on governmental viewpoint'"' in-
11 Minot, 308 N.W.2d at 871.
11 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23 S 1C2c (1982).
157 Id. at S lc2d.
11 This contention is supported by various statements by the Mayor of Indianapolis and
the Marion County prosecutor. See infra note 210.
19 See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
16 The Court in Erznoznik readily dismissed the city's justifications for its ordinance.
First, the Court declared that the city had no right to decide what kinds of materials were
unfit for its citizens. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208-12. Second, the Court rejected the city's
argument that the restrictions fell within the police power. Id. at 212-13. Finally, the Court
dismissed the city's contention that the ordinance was directed at traffic safety. Id. at
214-15. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. Similarly, the Borough of Mt. Ephraim
in Schad contended that its ordinance was a means of allowing only businesses which catered
to residents' "immediate needs" and of avoiding trash and clutter. Schad, 452 U.S. at 72-73.
The Court rejected these contentions because the "Borough [did not establish] that its in-
terests could not be met by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of ex-
pression." Id. at 74.
161 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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stead of on content alone. The Supreme Court regards the viewpoint-content
distinction as crucial and will not sustain regulations of speech based on
the "sovereign's agreement or disagreement with ... what a speaker has
to say." ' There is at least one instance in which statements of policy reveal
a desire to enact viewpoint-based restrictions. Shortly after the Special Ex-
ceptions Ordinance was declared unconstitutional in Cutshaw v. City of
Indianapolis,"' the city planning staff recommended approval'1 5 of a special
exception" for a motel that wished to show in-room adult movies. 67 Within
a week, according to The Indianapolis Star, the Mayor of Indianapolis issued
a memorandum to planning and development officials in which he "noted
how unhappy he was to learn that the city staff had supported the grant-
ing of the ... variance ... to allow the use of movies at the motel." ' The
Mayor's reaction to the planning staffs recommendation might reflect a
"stamp out adult movies" campaign, which is an impermissible form of
censorship,"9 or a crusade to "clean up" Indianapolis by regulating morals,
which is equally impermissible since it might reflect a viewpoint-based
restriction.17 Recent public statements by the Mayor, however, reflect
his apparent recognition of the constitutional limitations on obliterating
adult uses. In March, 1983, Mr. Hudnut assured a neighborhood organiza-
tion that the City of Indianapolis was doing everything possible to close
adult bookstores and massage parlors. The Mayor added, however, that
"we have to do it in a way that holds up in court."171
In addition to its suppressive effect, the Indianapolis ordinance contains
an amortization clause that forces each owner of regulated uses to obtain
18 Young, 427 U.S. at 64 (plurality opinion).
18 No. 30, 170 (Johnson County Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 9, 1980).
18 The Boards as a matter of course are advised by the planning and zoning staff. See
IND. CODES 36-7-4-920(d) (1982).
" Minutes of the Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Div. Two, at 7-8 (June 9, 1981).
181 The motel catered mainly to truck drivers and was located in an older industrial sec-
tion of Indianapolis that was bordered by a residential area. Minutes of the Metropolitan
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Div. Two, at 7-8 (June 9, 1981). No one appeared at the hearing
to object to the exception. Id.
1" According to the article, the Mayor seemed upset at the very notion that any city
official would condone adult uses in Marion County. Indianapolis News, July 24, 1981, at
43, col. 6. In this case, a variance as well as a Special Exception was needed because the
motel was within 500 feet of a residential district. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23
S 1B2 (1982).
"8 As noted earlier, it was pointed out in Young that an outright ban on adult movies
instead of the imposition of restrictions "addressed only to the places at which the type
of expression may be presented" would be impermissible. Young, 427 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell,
J., concurring). The Mayor made similar remarks the following October at an anti-
pornography rally in downtown Indianapolis. He said, "There are two sides to the por-
nography question, I know. But I'd be happy if there weren't any adult bookstores and
massage parlors in Indianapolis.... I think we need to recognize when the majority of
a community is against something and then do something to stop it." Indianapolis Star,
Oct. 10, 1981, at 23, col. 1.
' See Young, 427 U.S. at 64 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
I Indianapolis News, Mar. 3, 1983, at 33, col. 5.
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a special exception before January 1, 1978172 or risk receiving an injunction"'
and order of closure from the Marion County courts. This provision again
raises the twin spectres of an improper means-to-end relationship and a
viewpoint-based restriction on speech. If the city's goal were the
maintenance of property values, then that goal could have been reached
through a much more direct means-to-end approach without using the amor-
tization clause. Moreover, the amortization clause increases the danger of
total suppression of adult uses and recalls the suppression-regulation
distinction set forth in Young."4 Finally, the clause implies municipal distaste
for adult uses and again raises the viewpoint-content distinction that the
Supreme Court holds in high regard.Y7 5 In short, the risk of suppression,
the loose means-to-end fit, and the amortization clause combine to suggest
that the Special Exceptions Ordinance cannot survive Young safeguards
against total suppression of protected speech.'
12 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE app. D. pt. 23, S 1D (1982). The amortization clause provides that:
1. ... All Class 1 Regulated Commercial Uses ... existing in any zoning district
within Marion County on [Sept. 13, 1976]:
a. Shall conform to all requirements ... of this ordinance, including the
requirement of obtaining a grant of special exception to permit such Class
1 Regulated Commercial Use, on or before January 1, 1978; or
b. Such use shall be amortized and terminated upon such date, and all
use of the land, structure or premises thereater shall be in accordance with
permitted land uses and regulations of the applicable zoning district.
1 Indiana law empowers the Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County
to seek injunctions. See IND. CODE S 36-7-4-404(c) (1982).
-I' Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
175 Id. at 62-63.
I" The foregoing analysis of the Indianapolis ordinance can also be discussed in terms
of Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Young. Id. at 73-84 (Powell, J., concurring). Even
though Justice Powell did not adopt the plurality's "less protected speech" rationale, the
same infirmities exist under his analysis. Justice Powell viewed the Detroit ordinance as
"an example of innovative land-use regulation, implementing First Amendment concerns
only incidentally and to a limited extent." Id. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell
found the city's interest in avoiding urban blight sufficient to warrant incidental effects
on first amendment rights. Id. at 80-82 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell was mindful,
however, that an ordinance could reflect a desire to suppress free expression. He noted
that "[lt is clear both from the chronology and from the facts that Detroit has not embarked
on an effort to suppress free expression," id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring), and observed
that "a zoning ordinance that merely specifies where a theater may locate, and that does
not reduce significantly the number or accessibility of theatres presenting particular films,
stifles no expression." Id. at 81 nA (Powell, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Powell cautioned
against "using the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression," id. at 84 (Powell,
J., concurring), and advised courts to be watchful of this regulatory tactic. Id. (Powell,
J., concurring).
Justice Powell's opinion also points to another weakness of the Indianapolis Ordinance.
Justice Powell noted that Detroit's anti-skid row ordinance "was already in existence, and
its purposes clearly set out, for a full decade before adult establishments were brought
under it." Id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring). In fact, the ordinance as originally enacted
governed hotels or motels, establishments that served beer or liquor, pawnshops, billiard
halls, rooming houses, second stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls. Detroit, Mich.,
Ordinance 742-G S 66.0000 (Oct. 26, 1972). Justice Powell used the scope of the Detroit
ordinance as first enacted as further evidence of the city's interest in fighting blight in-
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CONCLUSION
Ordinances that restrict first amendment rights have been subjected to
changing doctrines and applications over the past forty years. The original
requirement of content neutrality has been modified to allow categoriza-
tion of certain forms of speech that can be regulated in furtherance of
governmental interests. In the area of non-obscene "adult" speech and con-
duct, the Young plurality permits regulations that do not effect a prior
restraint, that ensure limited administrative discretion, and that lack vague
provisions. Furthermore, although the Young plurality classified "adult"
speech as "less protected," the Court made it clear that less protected
speech cannot be totally suppressed and that a governmental interest in
suppressing adult speech will not justify regulation.
The Indianapolis Special Exceptions Ordinance is a paradigmatic exam-
ple of a statute that regulates adult uses but that cannot survive the tests
set forth in Young. First, the ordinance contains vague language that works
a chilling effect on protected speech; second, the broad administrative
discretion permitted by the ordinance increases the likelihood of prior
restraint; third, the scope of the ordinance makes total suppression of adult
speech possible; fourth, an asserted governmental interest in inhibiting ur-
ban blight is too attenuated given the means for reaching that goal; and
finally, municipal policies behind the ordinance suggest a desire to suppress
adult uses and not to disperse or concentrate them. These infirmities in-
dicate that, even within the fairly broad regulatory framework of Young,
the Indianapolis Special Exceptions Ordinance cannot withstand a constitu-
tional challenge.
KENNETH L. TURCHI
stead of in suppressing expression. Id. at 80-81 (Powell, J., concurring). The Indianapolis
ordinance, on the other hand, applies only to four uses: amusement arcades, massage parlors,
adult bookstores, and adult theaters, INDIANAPOUS, IND., CODE app. D, pt. 23 S 1A1 to 4 (1982).
Furthermore, the Indianapolis ordinance did not amend prior skid row legislation; it in
fact represents the city's sole attempt to control uses that might hasten urban blight. This
singular treatment of adult uses adds further support to the notion that the ordinance
speaks to the suppression of certain types of speech that the city finds distasteful and
not to the inhibition of urban deterioration.
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